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This paper estimates the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution (MECR) 
associated with a demogrant and an in-work benefit for the UK since 1979, 
taking account of extensive as well as intensive labour supply responses. The 
principal methodological advance in the paper is its greater allowance for 
heterogeneity in the population than previous work. The rate of tax on 
consumption expenditure is allowed to vary across households and overall tax 
rates are allowed to vary across all individuals in all years, using a 
microsimulation methodology for the calculations. This disaggregation makes a 
substantial difference to the results. 
The central finding of the paper is that the MECR is much lower for the in-work 
benefit policy than the demogrant. The efficiency loss associated with a marginal 
in-work benefit has consistently been low (and occasionally negative): even at its 
current 25-year high, the policy would cost losers only £1.30 per pound that the 
gainers gained. By contrast, losers from a demogrant would currently lose £4.30 
per pound that gainers received, higher than at other times over the last 15 years 
but still well short of the peak of £8.02 seen in 1981. Although precise estimates 
are highly sensitive to the overall levels of tax rates and elasticities, and also to 
the composition of the overall labour supply elasticity, the principal finding of a 
stark contrast between the two policies is robust.  
The paper also examines the effect of redistribution within family types. The in-
work benefit policy looks even more favourable if paid to (and financed by) only 
singles; it looks less favourable if implemented only for childless couples. 
Increasing in-work benefits and/or cutting tax rates for lone parents have 
provided opportunities for Pareto-improving reforms to the tax and benefit 
system for most of the period since 1979.  
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1. Introduction 
Optimal income tax theory provides the classic framework economists use to 
think about how best to manage the trade-off between income inequality and 
economic efficiency. The marginal efficiency cost of redistribution (MECR) 
provides a measure of this trade-off for particular policies that does not require 
prior assumptions on social preferences, and which policy-makers can therefore 
compare against their own priorities when evaluating policy reforms. 
Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal paper on optimal income taxation allowed only for 
labour supply responses that took the form of smooth changes in hours. Since 
then, the empirical labour economics literature has increasingly emphasised the 
importance of discrete labour supply responses. Reflecting this, Saez (2002) 
extended optimal income tax theory to include both intensive and extensive 
margins of labour supply. Immervol et al (2004) showed how measurement of 
the MECR could take both margins into account and estimated the MECRs 
associated with a demogrant and an in-work benefit for 14 European countries 
for 1998. 
In this paper, I take Immervol et al’s (2004) analysis further for the UK, showing 
how allowing for a greater degree of heterogeneity in the tax rates facing the 
population can affect the results, and estimating how the MECRs associated with 
a demogrant and an in-work benefit have changed since 1979. I also show how 
the relative efficiency cost of the two policies differs between family types. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 briefly reviews the relevant 
existing literature. Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 set out and discuss the behavioural 
model I use and the calculation of the MECR for the two policies under 
consideration. Section 2.4 discusses the implications of heterogeneity in 
earnings, tax rates and elasticities, and lays out a strategy to deal with it. Section 
3 describes the data used for estimation; Sections 4 and 5 respectively deal with 
the calculation of tax rates and the choice of assumed elasticities. Results are 
presented in Section 6, and their implications are discussed in Section 7 along 
with possible directions for future research. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. The model 
2.1 Background 
Economists have long recognised that redistributing income from rich to poor 
entails a trade-off between equality of income and economic efficiency. If 
redistribution is based directly on income, the withdrawal of benefits and 
imposition of taxes must at some point in the income distribution reduce the 
incentive to increase that income. For the last 30 years, the dominant framework 
among economists for thinking about the management of this trade-off has been 
optimal income tax theory, initiated in its modern form by Mirrlees (1971). 
Mirrlees’ seminal paper set out the relevant parameters, and the relationship 
between them, for designing a tax (and benefit) schedule that optimized the 
trade-off between equality and redistribution given a set of social preferences and 
certain other assumptions. Numerous papers followed, calibrating the optimal tax 
schedule for particular sets of parameters or altering the assumptions under 
which it operated (see Tuomala, 1990, for examples of both and a review of 
previous work).  
All of these papers, however, required assuming a set of social preferences 
(typically utilitarian or Rawlsian). Browning and Johnson (1984) adopted a 
different approach: rather than calculating a tax schedule that optimized the 
equality-efficiency trade-off for a particular social welfare function, they 
formulated a measure of the trade-off associated with marginal reforms to the tax 
schedule (the marginal efficiency cost of redistribution [MECR]), against which 
policy-makers could measure their social preferences. Others (Ballard, 1988; 
Triest, 1994; Browning, 1995) followed. 
However, these papers followed Mirrlees in allowing for labour supply to adjust 
only along the intensive margin (hours of work). Over the 1980s and 1990s, an 
increasing body of empirical work emphasised the importance of discontinuous 
participation responses (eg Cogan, 1981; MaCurdy et al, 1990). This became 
particularly important for the optimal taxation literature because over this period 
both the UK and the US greatly expanded their programmes of in-work support: 
these involved negative marginal tax rates, which were sub-optimal in the  5
Mirrlees model but not in Diamond’s (1980) model of optimal income tax model 
with only extensive (participation) responses.  
Saez’s (2002) important paper integrated the Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond 
(1980) models, deriving an optimal taxation model with both intensive and 
extensive labour supply responses. In Saez’s model, the merits of negative 
marginal tax rates depend on the importance of the extensive margin.
1 
2 
Immervol et al (2004) did for this what Browning and Johnson (1984) did for the 
Mirrlees model: remove the need for an assumed social welfare function by 
estimating the MECR instead. Immervol et al (2004) estimated the MECR 
associated with a demogrant policy and an in-work benefit policy in 1998 for 14 
European countries. Prior to this, Liebman (2002) had already incorporated an 
extensive margin in his analysis of the US Earned Income Tax Credit 
(accordingly generating a much more favourable view of it than Browning, 
1995), but in a much less transparent way; Liebman also considered only large 
hypothetical reforms to the EITC, with rather narrower implications than a 
comparison of marginal reforms. 
The framework within which I operate is that of Immervol et al (2004) 
(henceforth IKKS). It is ideally suited to the purpose of examining the equality-




2.2 The model 
A key focus of this paper is the explicit modelling of an extensive margin of 
labour supply. Empirically, the distribution of working hours is not continuous: 
very few people work only 1 or 2 hours per week as we would expect if only the 
intensive margin were relevant. Accordingly, much of the policy debate is 
framed in terms of participation and unemployment rather than hours of work.  
                                                 
1 Choné and Laroque (2001) present a model with only extensive responses, but allowing for a 
greater degree of heterogeneity than either Diamond (1980) or Saez (2002).  
2 The possible optimality of negative marginal rates remains controversial, however: see 
Homburg (2002). 
3 I deliberately set out the model in a similar way to IKKS, adopting the notation and much of the 
terminology of that paper for transparency and ease of comparison.  6
There are several ways in which an extensive margin could arise: for example, it 
could reflect a fixed cost employers face in employing someone, or non-workers’ 
being off their labour supply curves. This paper follows most of the literature 
since Cogan (1981) in introducing the extensive margin via a fixed cost of 
working that the individual faces, denoted q.  q may represent, amongst other 
things, the time and money needed to travel to work; the cost of buying an 
appropriate uniform/outfit; childcare costs;
4 pure (dis)taste for participation; or 
stigma associated with being out of work. It can perfectly well be negative in this 
model (people for whom stigma is especially important, for example), but it is 
probably not for most people as we would then expect to observe substantial 
bunching at one hour per week, which we do not.  
The IKKS model assumes that the population can be divided into J distinct 
groups with Nj individuals in group j. Within each group, individuals differ only 
in their fixed cost of work q: they are assumed to have identical variable costs of 
work and productivities (which are exogenous); a competitive labour market is 
assumed so that identical productivities equate to identical wage rates  j w . 
Variable costs of work and productivities are allowed to vary across groups.   
Individuals’ utility takes the form 
  (,,) () 1 ( 0 ) jj uc l q cvl q l =− −⋅ >  (1) 
where  c is family consumption, 1(·) is the indicator function and vj(l) is the 
variable cost of working l hours, normalized so that  (0) 0 j v = . Analogous to the 
fixed cost of working, vj(l) incorporates any cost that varies with hours worked, 
including the variable element of childcare costs, for example, as well as the pure 
disutility of working extra hours and having less leisure.  
                                                 
4 Childcare costs frequently consume a very large share of earnings for families with all adults 
working, so it is worth taking some care as to how they are incorporated. They are likely to take 
neither a simple fixed cost nor a simple hourly rate form. Childcare might be available at an 
hourly rate, and even if not the cost could vary with hours or quality if childcare is available from 
different providers. On the other hand, such choices may be limited, or there may be associated 
fixed costs such as transporting the child(ren) to and from the provider. The prevalence of 
informal provision adds a further layer of complication since the cost, monetary or in terms of an 
implicit promise to reciprocate the favour, may or may not vary with the number of hours used. 
In any case, q incorporates only the fixed element; variable elements are incorporated in the 
variable costs of work, discussed below.  7
The quasilinear form of utility implies that there are no income effects. This is a 
strong assumption; however, since I consider only revenue-neutral reforms, the 
assumption is a problem only to the extent that true income effects are 
heterogeneous across groups affected differently by the reforms. 
A word is in order on what equation (1) means for the treatment of couples. 
Individual utility is given as a function of family consumption, so income is fully 
pooled, a public good within the family; but only individual hours enter the 
variable cost of work: the value of an individual’s leisure is assumed to be 
independent of the leisure of any partner. A feature of this model is that an 
individual’s response to a reform takes no account of any response his/her 
partner may have. This can be embodied in an explicit assumption that each takes 
the other’s labour supply behaviour as given; alternatively, a weaker assumption 
that  q, like vj(l), is independent of the partner’s labour supply behaviour is 
sufficient (along with the assumption of no income effects) to generate this 
feature. In any case, however, the assumptions that family income is completely 
pooled and that labour supply decisions are taken without reference to other 
family members seem individually rather implausible and certainly sit uneasily 
together. Bringing the burgeoning economic literature on modelling family 
decision-making to bear on this and similar models would be a fruitful avenue 
for future research. 
Finally, note that utility is entirely independent of the incomes and labour supply 
behaviour of members of other households: there is no envy or guilt, no 
benchmarking one’s own expectations against acquaintances’ circumstances or 
societal norms. 
Individuals face a non-linear tax and benefit schedule  ( , ) j Tw lz, where z is an 
abstract shift parameter we use for analyzing tax reforms; thus  (0, ) Tz will 
usually be negative and defines the welfare benefit for non-workers. This 
characterization of the tax and benefit system is far from innocuous: it implies  8
that taxes and benefits depend only on individual earnings, independent of family 
structure, the earnings of any partner, non-labour income etc. 
5 
The assumption of identical productivities and variable costs of work within 
groups ensures that all individuals in a group will work the same hours  j l  
conditional on participation, namely that which equates the net-of-tax wage rate 
to the marginal cost of work. They will therefore have the same net earnings, 
(, ) jj jj wl T wl z − , if in work. This is a static model, so there is no saving and 
consumption equals net income. The difference between in-work consumption cj 
and out-of-work consumption c0, ie the net financial gain to work, is given by net 
earnings less out-of-work benefits, ie 
  0 (, )( 0 , ) . jj j j j ccw lT w l zTz −= − +  (2) 
Since all individuals in a group have the same earnings if working, all face the 














and the same participation tax rate, defined as 
 









≡≡ −  (4) 
The participation tax rate for group j is thus the proportion of earnings that is lost 
in tax and forgone benefits when an individual in that group starts work at  j l  
hours. While I use the terminology ‘marginal tax rate’ and ‘participation tax rate’ 
for brevity, it is important to remember throughout that these describe the work 
incentives induced by the whole tax and benefit system: particularly at the lower 
end of the income distribution, benefit withdrawal is frequently the largest 
component of these tax rates. 
Individuals will choose to work if the utility from working exceeds that from not 
working, ie if their gain to work exceeds the fixed plus variable costs of working. 
                                                 
5 An alternative assumption that all other characteristics upon which the tax and benefit schedule 
depends are constant within groups is sufficient to yield the key result of a constant in-work 
marginal rate and participation tax rate within each group.  9
Since all individuals in a group have the same gain to work and the same variable 
cost of working, we can define for each group a threshold value of the fixed cost,  
  0 () . jj j j qccv l ≡−−  (5) 
All individuals with a fixed cost below the threshold value for their group will 
work lj hours, all with fixed costs above qj will choose not to work. Denoting by 
() j Fqand ( ) j f q respectively the distribution and density functions of q, we can 
see that 
0 () ( )
j q
jj j Fq fq d q =∫  gives the employment rate for group j. 
The extensive (participation) elasticity of labour supply for group j is defined as 
the percentage change in the number of workers in group j following a 1 percent 
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The absence of income effects means there is no distinction between 
compensated and uncompensated elasticities. 
 
2.3 The marginal efficiency cost of redistribution 
The general case 
This paper explores the trade-off between economic efficiency and income 
redistribution in the model set out above. The focus of the paper is on the key 
parameters affecting this trade-off rather than on the realism of the reforms 
considered. To that end, I keep the analysis simple by considering only revenue-
neutral marginal reforms. In this section I consider the general case of an 
arbitrary revenue-neutral marginal reform. The following two subsections look at 
the specific examples to be considered: lump-sum redistribution of the proceeds 
of a uniform increase in marginal tax rates, either to the whole population or just 
to those in work. These two reforms are simple, but capture the key features of a  10
central policy debate: the choice between providing additional support to all 
those with low incomes or just to low-income workers. Examining this choice by 
explicitly distinguishing between intensive and extensive labour supply 
responses is the key contribution of Saez (2002) and IKKS, and this paper 
attempts to refine and then build on their analyses.  
The trade-off measure used is that of Browning and Johnson (1984). I divide the 
population into individuals who gain from the reform and those who lose; the 
trade-off measure Ψ  is simply the ratio of the aggregate loss of the losers to the 
aggregate gain of the gainers. The identity of these gainers and losers is, of 
course, endogenous to the reform. I refer to this measure as the marginal 
efficiency cost of redistribution (MECR), although Ballard’s (1988) original use 
of the term is in fact equal to Ψ – 1.
6 
One simplification that arises from analysing marginal reforms is that the 
(second-order) welfare effects of behavioural responses can be ignored, by 
application of the envelope theorem. There is thus no need to distinguish 
between monetary gains and losses and welfare gains and losses. Defining 
(, ) jj j TT w l z ≡  and  0 (0, ) TTz ≡ to simplify notation, IKKS show that the effect 
of a marginal reform dz on an individual’s utility is simply the mechanical 








dz T qq z
∂ ⎧−≤ ⎪ ∂ = ⎨
∂ ⎪−> ∂ ⎩
, (8) 
 
except for those who start or stop working in response to the reform, whose 
change in utility is the difference in utilities between the two states. IKKS state 
that, because the marginal worker is indifferent towards working and the group 
of movers is infinitesimally small, this group can be ignored in calculating the 
                                                 
6 As Browning and Johnson (1984) point out, the MECR is closely related to Okun’s (1975) 
concept of ‘leakage’. Okun likened income redistribution to transferring money using a leaky 
bucket. The proportion of cost to rich that leaks out during transfer process is one minus the 
reciprocal of Ψ . Of course, how much leakage one would accept depends on the identity of the 
gainers and losers as well as social preferences, and Okun gave examples in which he specified 
the leakage he would be willing to accept for redistribution between particular sets of gainers and 
losers.  11
MECR. The key insight is that the first-order effects of labour supply responses, 
whether intensive or extensive, are on revenue and not directly on welfare. 
Using equation (8), IKKS state that the MECR for a general revenue-neutral 























where  G is the set of groups for which employed individuals gain from the 
reform. The numerator gives the aggregate losses of those groups that lose from 
the reform, and the denominator gives the aggregate gains of the groups that 
gain, which can include the welfare gains of non-workers since we examine no 
reforms in which non-workers lose.  
 
Demogrant 
The first policy I consider is an infinitesimal increase τ  in all marginal tax rates 
used to finance a universal lump-sum benefit TR: in other words, a revenue-
neutral Negative Income Tax of infinitesimal size bolted on to the existing tax 
and benefit system. Following the literature, I refer to this as a demogrant policy. 
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 (10) 
IKKS show that the deadweight cost of the reform (as a proportion of τ ) – the 
deadweight cost of a marginal increase in tax rates, since in this model with no 
income effects a flat-rate distribution of the proceeds will have no behavioural 
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∑  (11) 
where  () 1 /
J
jj j j j j j j s wlE wlE
= ≡ ∑  is group j’s share of aggregate labour income.   12
As well as being critical in determining the MECR, the deadweight loss rate D is 
interesting in itself. Many economists will be more familiar with the concept of 
deadweight loss than with the MECR, and it has the advantage that it does not 
depend on identifying endogenous winners and losers. However, D is purely a 
measure of the efficiency cost of the reform: it says nothing about its 
redistributive impact, so it does not suffice for present purposes. As IKKS imply, 
τ D is the difference between the aggregate loss of the losers and the gain of 
gainers, while Ψ is the ratio between them. Thus for a progressive reform, a 
given level of deadweight loss will be associated with a lower MECR if the 
reform achieves a greater degree of redistribution. In Section 6 I report values of 
both D and Ψ for my baseline case. 
d D could in principle be negative, if tax rates were below zero or above 100% for 
groups with sufficiently high income shares and elasticities, but this possibility is 
rather far-fetched and I exclude it from further consideration. More interestingly, 
d D could be greater than unity. This is quite feasible and would mean that 
existing tax rates exceeded the revenue-maximising level (Laffer bound), so that 
the government would actually lose money by raising them further. I ignore this 
possibility for now (in particular, equation (14) will be ill-defined for this case 
since there are no gainers from the reform and the denominator on the right-hand 
side is zero) but Section 6 and Appendix A present cases which fall into this 
category, and the implications of this are discussed in Section 7. 
The revenue to be distributed is the fraction of ‘mechanical’ revenue (the 
increment in marginal rates times aggregate labour income) not lost due to 







TR N D w l E τ
=
⋅=− ⋅ ∑  (12) 
Substituting into equation (8) and simplifying, we see that the gainers from the 

























where  () / gj jG pE N E N
∈ ≡+ − ∑  is the population share, and  gj jG s s
∈ ≡∑ the 
wage share, of those gaining from the reform. 
 
In-work benefit 
The second policy under consideration is again an increase in all marginal tax 
rates, but this time with the proceeds distributed (lump-sum) only to workers, 
leaving out-of-work income unchanged. This is referred to as the in-work benefit 
policy. 
The policy is formally defined by 
 












The deadweight cost of raising the revenue is Dd as for the demogrant policy, but 
the in-work benefit will also induce a positive participation response, giving rise 
to an offsetting deadweight gain. IKKS derive the overall deadweight loss from 
























where / jj eE E ≡ is the proportion of workers who are in group j. The 
denominator here reflects the positive participation response to the reform, and 
w D  may be positive or negative according to whether the deadweight gain from 
this participation response outweighs the deadweight loss from raising the 
revenue. There are now two circumstances in which  w D  can be greater than one 
and hence the MECR can be undefined in equation (19) below. The first is if 
1 d D > : this is the case discussed above of tax rates above the Laffer bound, in 
which case there is no revenue raised with which to pay for the in-work benefit  14











− ∑  so 
that the denominator of (16) is negative: this is the case in which a lump-sum 
payment to those in work actually raises money for the government because it 
induces so many people to enter work that the additional tax revenues and saved 
out-of-work benefits for entrants outweighs the cost of paying the in-work 
benefit to existing workers. In that case the reform cannot be made revenue-
neutral, the size of the benefit is indeterminate and we cannot define a trade-off 
between gains and losses.
7 In principle, the numerator and denominator in (16) 
could both be negative at the same time, generating a value of  w D  less than one 
and a well-behaved MECR. This is the highly perverse case of a revenue-raising 
in-work benefit being used to pay for a revenue-reducing rise in tax rates. 







TR E D w l E τ
=
⋅=− ⋅ ∑  (17) 
























where  gj jG ee
∈ ≡∑ is the share of employed people gaining from the reform.
8 
 
                                                 
7 The fact that this is a marginal reform analysis is relevant here. A large enough in-work benefit 
will always cost money since, as the benefit raises employment rates towards 100%, the 
extensive elasticity of labour supply will tend towards zero, and further payments will generate 
no additional participation response and so no deadweight gain. 
8 Sg, the earnings share of those gaining from the reform, will of course take a different value here 
from in equation (14) since the set of gainers from the two reforms is different.  15
Redistribution within demographic groups 
The analysis above need not apply to the whole population. It is equally 
applicable to a lump-sum payment to all individuals (or all working individuals) 
in any subsection of the population, financed by a tax increase for the same 
subsection. The majority of the results I present are for the whole population 
(subject to some exclusions detailed in the next two Sections), but I also analyse 
the two reforms introduced within each of four broad family types: singles and 
couples, with and without children.  
One reason for looking at reforms within particular groups is that it allows 
sceptical readers to focus on an analysis for which the rather implausible model 
of couples’ behaviour presented above does not need to be assumed. More 
fundamentally, it can give pointers as to whether the relative merits of a 
demogrant and an in-work benefit vary between family types, and whether more 
redistribution might reasonably be achieved within family types without 
redistributing between family types and thereby having to enter the choppy 
waters of utility comparisons between different family structures. Given a 
particular level of redistribution between family types, the optimal tax schedule 
might have very different shapes for different demographic groups.
9 For 
example, it might well be optimal to have higher in-work benefits for groups 
with higher extensive elasticities (notably those with higher fixed costs, such as 
parents). Similarly, tilting the existing budget constraint might be more efficient 
(or less inefficient) for some groups than others. In-work support in the UK has 
always been provided exclusively or primarily for couples and those with 
children, possibly for the very reason just mentioned. This exercise can be 
informative as to the merits of increasing or reducing this differential treatment – 
whether one groups would be better served by an increase in in-work benefits 
and another by a demogrant – while financing the reform within the group so as 
not to change the governments’ chosen degree of redistribution between family 
types. 
 
                                                 
9 An implication of Kremer (1997) is that, if group membership is exogenous, the optimal tax 
problem should be solved independently for each group, once an allocation between groups is 
decided on the basis of the groups’ abilities/incomes (and needs or anything else that affects 
groups’ social welfare weights).  16
2.4 Choice of groups and the role of disaggregation 
This model assumes that all individuals in a group are identical except for their 
fixed cost of work, with the same earnings in work, labour supply elasticities and 
marginal and participation tax rates. The plausibility of any empirical results 
potentially rests on the plausibility of this assumption, and it is therefore 
important to ensure that results are not severely distorted by aggregating the 
population into excessively large groups. IKKS divide the population into 100 
groups defined by pairs of (a) decile groups of gross individual earnings and (b) 
ten demographic types: singles, lone parents, childless men with working 
partners, childless men with non-working partners, fathers with working partners, 
fathers with non-working partners, childless women with working partners, 
childless women with non-working partners, mothers with working partners, and 
mothers with non-working partners. Disaggregating earnings, elasticities and tax 
rates into 100 groups allows for more variation across the population than most 
previous work, and IKKS argue that it adequately captures observed 
heterogeneity and that further disaggregation is therefore unnecessary.  
However, even this level of aggregation may be excessive. Inspection of 
equation (11), reproduced here for easy viewing, reveals the effect on estimated 
deadweight loss of aggregating small (homogeneous) groups into larger 
(heterogeneous) groups and using average values of their earnings, tax rates and 
















=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠
∑  
Using averaged elasticities or earnings will be benign if and only if they are 
uncorrelated with each other and with tax rates; otherwise d D will be 
underestimated if the correlation is positive, overestimated if the correlation is 
negative. (Only correlations within the heterogeneous group are relevant, of 
course.) Using averaged tax rates, however, will lead to a systematic downward 
bias in estimates of d D even if the tax rates are uncorrelated with other  17
characteristics, since d D is nonlinear in j τ and  j a .
10 This is a simple application of 
Jensen’s inequality, but seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the literature to 
date despite its potentially far-reaching consequences.
11 
Clearly, then, it is worth taking pains to disaggregate the data as far as possible, 
and in particular to disaggregate tax rates as far as possible since ignoring any 
degree of heterogeneity in tax rates will result in systematically underestimating 
the marginal efficiency cost of taxation. In this paper I therefore use individual-
level disaggregation of earnings and elasticities, with each group j containing a 
single worker. I do assume that elasticities are constant within each of IKKS’s 
100 groups – the use of individual-level elasticities would require estimating a 
full labour supply model, an exercise left for future research – but wage rates, 
hours of work and tax rates are allowed to vary and be correlated freely between 
individuals. Allowing for heterogeneity in this way is one of the major 
innovations introduced in this paper; how much difference it makes to the final 
results is an empirical question I address in Section 6. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Similar problems accompany the estimation of w D , but the direction of bias is ambiguous. 
Estimation of the trade-off measures  d Ψ and  w Ψ will be further bedevilled by averaging 
earnings within groups, which (along with the averaging of tax rates) will lead to errors in 
dividing the population into gainers and losers, although it is more difficult to ascertain the 
direction of the resulting biases in this case. 
11 See Fullerton and Gan (2003), however, for a similar point.  18
3. Data 
The data used is drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1979-2000, 
and its successor the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) 2001. These are annual 
cross-sectional surveys of around 7,000 broadly representative UK households, 
which provide detailed micro-data on many individual and household 
characteristics, including individual income and household expenditure data. 
Grossing factors supplied with the data are used to make the sample 
representative of the UK population as a whole. Details of the FES and the EFS 
can be found in ONS (2001b) and ONS (2002) respectively.
12 
In order to produce estimates that are as up-to-date as possible, I uprate the 2001 
EFS data to simulate data for the last three years, 2002-04. This is done by 
uprating monetary income and expenditure variables in line with changes in 
appropriate indices: earnings in line with the average earnings index, rents in line 
with the rent sub-index of the retail prices index (RPI) and so on. This procedure 
is fairly crude, neglecting any changes in income inequality as well as any 
changes in the demographic makeup of the population, but should be a 
reasonable approximation. 
The sample used in this paper excludes a number of groups because their labour 
supply behaviour is likely to be very different from that of the rest of the 
population (or because their tax and benefit position is difficult to model). The 
excluded groups are: those aged under 19, those aged over 55, students, those 
with a self-employed individual in the family, those receiving a disability benefit, 
and those who report positive hours worked but no earnings. This is not merely a 
technical convenience: it means that the policy reforms analysed must be thought 
of as applying only to individuals who do not fall into these categories, and 
conclusions might be affected by this. The estimated trade-off between equality 
and efficiency applies to a reform covering the whole population only insofar as 
those excluded have characteristics and behaviour similar to that of the used 
                                                 
12 The FES operated on a calendar-year basis before 1994 and a financial-year basis thereafter. 
All results given by year therefore refer to calendar years up to and including 1993 and financial 
years thereafter. 
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sample. The exclusion of older workers is of particular significance here, since 
they are a large group with special issues pertaining to their labour supply, and 
making policy without reference to the effect on this group is not a sensible or 
practical option. 
The nature of the model is that only the number of non-workers, not their 
demographic characteristics or incomes, is used directly in the model. All their 
characteristics (including, importantly, their counterfactual wage distribution) are 
instead implicit in the extensive elasticities used. The employed sample consists 
of 128,626 observations in total, 112,099 excluding the simulated 2002-04 data. 
Employment rates by demographic type and sample sizes for each of IKKS’s 100 
groups are shown in Table 1.
13 
                                                 
13 This and all other Tables are contained in Appendix C.  20
4. Calculating tax rates 
A vital part of the analysis in this paper is the calculation of marginal and 
participation tax rates for each working individual in the sample. This is done 
using the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ tax and benefit microsimulation model, 
TAXBEN.
14 Microsimulation allows us to capture all the rich variation in 
individual circumstances we observe and all the complex interactions that occur 
between different parts of the tax and benefit system. Most of the literature to 
date has used highly simplified and stylized approximations to the relevant tax 
and benefit systems. IKKS’s use of the EUROMOD model was a substantial 
improvement on this. But EUROMOD is necessarily less detailed than 
TAXBEN, since it is designed for comparative research across many countries. 
In addition to this, the treatment of consumption taxes (see below) and the 
disaggregation to individual level means that the estimation technique employed 
here represents a further increase in sophistication. As mentioned in Section 2.4, 
accurate calculation at this level of disaggregation may be essential for accurate 
analysis.
15  
This is not the place to describe the structure of the UK tax and benefit system 
for the past 25 years.
16 The methodology for calculating marginal and 
participation tax rates and some limitations of the tax and benefit modelling are 
detailed in Appendix B. Here, I focus on the main innovation in my 
methodology. 
 
Consumption tax rates 
Taxes on consumption expenditure make up more than a third of the overall tax 
wedge on labour supply, yet their treatment in the literature on tax reform 
evaluation has been remarkably cursory. Spending on different goods and 
                                                 
14 TAXBEN is described in Giles and McCrae (1995). 
15 Indeed, in a sense even a separate calculation for each individual in the sample is an inadequate 
level of disaggregation, in that the use of grossing factors to ‘replicate’ each person in the sample 
understates the true degree of heterogeneity in the population. But in the absence of a rich survey 
of the whole UK population, little can be done to remedy this. 
16 For descriptions of the UK tax and benefit systems and brief overviews of their evolution, see 
Adam (2004) and Crawford and Shaw (2004) for taxes and benefits respectively. The main rates 
and thresholds in the tax and benefit system since 1979 can be found at 
www.ifs.org.uk/fiscalfacts.php.  21
services are taxed at different rates. Ideally, we would like to measure the tax rate 
that applies to spending out of marginal income (for the marginal tax rate) or out 
of the additional income from working (for the participation tax rate). 
Unfortunately, the requisite information on marginal spending patterns is not 
observable. IKKS therefore using a single rate calculated from national accounts 
aggregates, following the methodology of Mendoza et al (1994). Browning 
(1995) performs a similar but even simpler exercise, taking the consumption tax 
rate as the ratio of total sales and excise tax revenues to net national product. 
My analysis uses a different methodology. Each household in the FES and EFS 
keeps a two-week diary containing detailed information on household spending. 
This allows us to calculate the average tax rate that applies to each household’s 
actual spending, and I then use these as family-specific consumption tax rates 
(assuming this rate is shared by all families in multi-family households).  
This methodology has two major advantages over the use of national accounts 
aggregates. First and foremost, it captures the observed heterogeneity in 
household spending patterns. As discussed in Section 2.4, the nonlinearity of 
deadweight cost with respect to tax rates means that even ‘benign’ variation in 
tax rates (orthogonal to other characteristics) can have an effect on the MECR; 
variation that is correlated with income and labour supply elasticities will have 
an even bigger effect, and is likely in practice since spending patterns vary with 
income and family type. Second, it restricts attention to the household sector. 
IKKS, for example, include spending by non-profit institutions and government 
non-wage outlays, while Browning (1995) looks at the whole economy; looking 
directly at household consumption spending allows us to focus more precisely on 
the wedge between family income and purchasing power.  
The measure is far from perfect. What is in fact calculated is each household’s 
average consumption tax rate, not their marginal consumption tax rate or 
consumption tax rate on participation. Treating all these as equal is akin to 
making the assumption that preferences are homothetic over the relevant 
margin
17. The assumption is in fact slightly weaker than homotheticity, since it 
                                                 
17 Homotheticity also ensures that the elasticities used in this paper, which are calculated with 
respect to income net of consumption taxes, are the same as those in the literature calculated with 
respect to income gross of consumption taxes.  22
need not be the case that the household buys the same goods in the same 
proportions when its income changes, only that the additional goods are taxed at 
the same rate, on average, as existing spending. The assumption nevertheless 
looks rather dubious; but the same implicit assumption is made on a national 
level if a national-accounts-aggregates methodology is used, and little alternative 
is available. 
Average estimated consumption tax rates in each year are shown in Figure 1. 
They have increased over time as the UK has shifted gradually from direct to 
indirect taxation. As the Figure shows, my methodology yields a slightly higher 
estimate of the average consumption tax rate than IKKS’s. Table 2 shows the 
mean and standard deviation of consumption tax rates, averaged over all years, 
for each of IKKS’s 100 groups. Table 3 and Table 4, similarly, show the 
variation between groups in overall marginal and participation tax rates 
respectively. The standard deviations shown, which are substantial, reflect a 
combination of variation over time and heterogeneity within groups in each year; 
to the extent that they reflect the latter, they demonstrate the importance of the 
individual-level disaggregation I pursue. 
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Figure 2 shows how average marginal and participation tax rates have changed 
since 1979. The Figure shows that the average participation tax rate is higher  23
than the average marginal tax rate, but that, although the two rates have moved in 
the same direction in almost every year, the gap between them has gradually 
narrowed over the period. The sharp rise in the average participation tax rate 
(and, to a lesser extent, in the average marginal tax rate) in 1981, which proves 
important to the final results, can largely be explained by a nominal freeze in 
income tax allowances at a time of double-digit inflation. However, in general 
one must be cautious about trying to track policy changes in these lines, since 
changes in average tax rates reflect changes in the demographic composition and 
gross income distribution of the population as well as changes in tax and benefit 
policy.
18 Ongoing work (Adam et al, forthcoming) examines changes in these 
and other work incentive measures in detail and attempts to separate out the 
various components of change. 
Figure 2.  Average effective marginal tax rates and participation tax rates 
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The similarity of mean and median tax rates in Figure 2, particularly since 1990, 
suggests that the distribution is not heavily skewed. Figure 3 shows how mean 
tax rates varied across the individual earnings distribution in a single year (1998, 
                                                 
18 A related point is that tracking policy ‘changes’ requires a choice of counterfactual ‘no change’ 
scenario. The potential importance of this in explaining changes is highlighted by Clark and 
Leicester (2004), who find that tax and benefit reforms account for approximately half of the 
increase in UK income inequality since 1979 if the counterfactual is price indexation of the tax 
and benefit system, but virtually none of the increase if the counterfactual is earnings indexation.  24
the year examined by IKKS). The mean participation tax rate is flat across most 
of the income distribution but successively lower for the poorest three decile 
groups; the mean marginal rate is also lower for the poorest decile group, but is 
then flat for decile groups 2 to 8, lower for the 9
th decile group and substantially 
higher for the richest tenth. It is of some concern that my estimates of mean 
participation tax rates are substantially higher than IKKS’s for all but the poorest 
tenth; I have no reason to believe that my estimates are seriously flawed, but in 
the light of this difference I look at the impact of scaling down my estimated 
participation tax rates in Section 6. 
Figure 3.  Mean marginal and participation rates for workers across the 
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A multitude of studies has attempted to estimate labour supply elasticities, and, 
although less divided than during the 1980s, the economics profession remains 
far away from a consensus on their magnitude. This paper does not add to that 
literature. It would be futile to attempt to reach a definitive conclusion, and in 
any case the theoretical model used here does not justify too meticulous a view 
of elasticities: 
-  we assume no income effects, which raises the question of whether to 
prefer estimates of compensated or uncompensated elasticities.  
-  it is a static model, and, as Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) argue, static 
elasticities lack a viable interpretation in most circumstances 
-  the modelling of couples’ labour supply decisions is unrealistic 
-  behavioural responses are restricted to labour supply. The incorporation 
of an extensive margin as well as an intensive one is an improvement on 
much of the previous literature, but Feldstein (1995) and subsequent 
studies have shown that other dimensions of response (effort, labour 
mobility, tax avoidance and evasion) are important so that the overall 
elasticity of taxable income, which is what matters for tax policy analysis 
(Feldstein 1999), is rather higher than that due to labour supply response 
alone. To some extent, the present model can crudely incorporate such 
considerations if, for example, the intensive elasticity is thought of rather 
loosely as measuring the responsiveness of hours worked in the UK and 
revealed to the Inland Revenue, rather than total hours worked. Such 
thought experiments are left to the reader’s discretion. 
To allow for some leeway in the treatment of these issues as well as catering for 
the sheer disagreement in the literature, I adopt an approach of choosing a 
broadly plausible baseline set of elasticities but testing a wide range of 
alternative specifications. As discussed in Section 2.4, elasticities are allowed to 
vary across 100 income-demographic type groups. Results are tested for 
robustness to the overall level of elasticities, the relative responsiveness of 
participation and hours, and the extent of variation across family types and  26
income groups (especially the responsiveness of the highest income decile 
group). 
It is important to remember that the extensive elasticity in particular is not an 
intrinsic preference parameter. Simple inspection of the definition of the 
extensive elasticity in equation (6), reproduced below for easy viewing, shows 
that a group’s extensive elasticity is determined by three components: the net 
financial gain to work for the group,  0 () j cc − ; the density of the distribution of 
fixed costs at the participation margin  ( ) jj f q ; and the group’s employment rate, 
() jj Fq  (itself a function of the gain to work and of the fixed and variable costs 











η ≡−  
The extensive elasticity is thus endogenous to the state of the economy in general 
and to the tax and benefit system in particular, via their effects on the gain to 
work, the costs of work, and the employment rate. It is purely for the sake of 
simplicity that I assume elasticities are constant over time. 
In choosing the baseline case, I have drawn on four of the more robust findings 
of the recent empirical literature: 
•  labour supply responses tend to be concentrated on the extensive margin 
(Cogan, 1981; Robins, 1985; Blundell et al, 1987; MaCurdy et al, 1990; 
Triest, 1990; Zabel, 1993; Blundell, 1995; Eissa and Liebman, 1996) 
•  extensive elasticities are high towards the bottom of the income 
distribution and very low towards the top (Blundell, 1995; Krueger and 
Meyer, 2002; Hotz et al, 2003) 
•  intensive elasticities are higher at the very top of the income distribution 
(Goolsbee, 2000; Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez, 2004)
19 
                                                 
19 This requires considerable qualification. The finding is in terms of the elasticity of taxable 
income, not necessarily the intensive elasticity of labour supply (although the results can loosely 
incorporate this, as mentioned above), and Saez (2004) argues that this effect may be restricted to 
the top 1% of taxpayers. Some of this responsiveness might only be short-term due to the 
exercise of stock options etc (Goolsbee, 2000), some might come from the self-employed, who 
are likely to have more scope to avoid or evade taxes (Blow and Preston, 2002) but who are  27
•  women with working partners, and to a lesser extent mothers, are more 
responsive than others on the extensive margin (Robins, 1985; Eissa and 
Liebman, 1996) but similar on the intensive margin (Mroz, 1987; 
Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz, 1990).  
The baseline elasticities are shown in Table 5. The numbers look perhaps 
surprisingly precise; they are best explained as follows:  
•  Extensive elasticities are five times as high for the poorest fifth of 
individuals as for the richest fifth, with even graduations in between 
•  Extensive elasticities are twice as high for women with working partners, 
and 1½ times as high for other mothers, as for others 
•  Intensive elasticities are twice as high for the richest tenth as for other 
groups, but otherwise do not vary 
•  With these relativities kept intact, all elasticities are then scaled so that 
the average extensive elasticity is 0.25 and the average intensive elasticity 
is 0.1. 
The extensive elasticities thus range from a maximum of 0.598 for a married 
mother in the lowest earning fifth of workers, for example, to a minimum of 0.06 
for, say, a single man in the top fifth of earners. Intensive elasticities are 0.182 
for individuals in the top decile group and 0.091 for all others. For comparison 
purposes, IKKS’s chosen elasticities are shown in Table 6. 
                                                                                                                                  
excluded here, and some of the very richest individuals make private tax arrangements with the 
Inland Revenue rather than being subject to a rigid tax regime. Gruber and Saez’s (2002) 
conclusion that “the patterns can only be taken as suggestive. But the findings do confirm the 
standard intuition that the highest income taxpayers are the ones that are most responsive to 
taxation” seems reasonable. It is important to take account of this group’s responsiveness, since 
their high income share makes them vital for revenue effects – the richest 1% of UK income tax 
payers currently account for 22% of receipts, for example – but because of these complications, 
the results of varying just the elasticities of the richest decile group are provided in Appendix A.   28
6. Results 
6.1. Baseline results 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show my central estimates of the deadweight cost and 
MECR associated with the two policies. The first point that leaps out is how  






























similar the two Figures look, which is unsurprising given how closely related the 
two measures are. The rare occasions in which they move in different directions 
reflect changes in the income distribution – the third determinant, alongside tax 
rates and elasticities, of the MECR, and one which has been little mentioned so 
far in this paper since it poses few difficulties in estimation. For example,  d Ψ  
has risen while Dd has fallen since the early-mid 1990s; inspection of equation 
(14) shows that this implies a fall in the proportion of people gaining from a 
demogrant policy or a rise in their earnings share. Given the similarity of the two 
measures and that the MECR is the object of interest, the remainder of the results 
are shown only for the MECR. 
d Ψ  has averaged 4.52 over the last 25 years and is now estimated at 4.30. Its 
movements have tracked movements in the average marginal and participation 
tax rates shown in Figure 2 almost perfectly, but have been more pronounced, 
most notably with the huge rise in 1981. This happens because an increase in tax 
rates is much more distortionary when increased from a high base and when 
elasticities are high. The big increase in 1981 was in participation tax rates, 
which already averaged 65%, and for this calculation labour supply responses are 
concentrated at the extensive margin. 
In contrast,  w Ψ , now estimated at 1.30 (its highest level over the period), has 
shown very little deviation from its average level of 1.12 over the years. With the 
extensive margin dominant (higher elasticities and higher tax rates than on the 
intensive margin), the positive participation response from an in-work benefit has 
tended to offset the negative response to the revenue-raising tax increase almost 
entirely. 
The MECR looks very favourable to the in-work benefit relative to the 
demogrant: in 2004, losers from the demogrant policy would have pay £4.30 for 
each pound that gainers from the policy receive, but losers from the in-work 
benefit policy would have to pay only £1.30 per pound that gainers receive. As 
discussed in Section 7, this does not necessarily mean the in-work benefit is to be 
preferred, since the gains and losses accrue to different people in the two cases. 
But the contrast between the two is stark.   30
I do not wish to emphasise comparisons with the results of previous studies. One 
lesson from the extent of variation over time shown in Figure 5 is that we should 
not necessarily expect estimates for different years, let alone different countries, 
to be similar.
20 The only study which gives directly comparable results is IKKS, 
which contains estimates for the UK in 1998. They estimate that the MECR for 
the demogrant was 1.88 and that for the in-work benefit 1.06 for their baseline 
case; my baseline estimates for that year are 3.84 and 0.99 respectively, much 
more favourable to the in-work benefit. Some reasons for these differences are 
given in the sections that follow. 
 
6.2. The choice of elasticities 
The elasticities on which the results in Section 6.1 are based represent my own 
judgement of reasonable values based on the existing literature. However, the 
magnitudes of these elasticities remains a matter of fierce dispute in the 
economics profession, so it is essential to conduct a thorough sensitivity analysis. 
While this exercise is a vital one, to be informative it must inevitably be long and 
somewhat repetitive, so a full exposition is left to an Appendix. The results can 
be summarised as follows: 
•  The value of  d Ψ  is highly sensitive to the average extensive elasticity in 
the population and fairly sensitive to the average intensive elasticity; in 
each case, higher elasticities are associated with a higher MECR. 
•  w Ψ  increases rapidly in the average intensive elasticity. The effect of the 
extensive elasticity on  w Ψ  is variable, however, tending to reduce it if 
low values of the intensive elasticity are assumed but not if high values 
are assumed. 
                                                 
20 For readers who would nevertheless like a comparison, the principal estimates are those of 
Browning and Johnson (1984) and Ballard (1988), which estimate the MECR associated with a 
demogrant for the US in 1976 and 1979 respectively. Browning and Johnson’s central estimate is 
3.49 and Ballard’s is 1.81. However, both distinguish between these utility-based MECRs and 
money-based MECRs (presumably because their analyses are not truly marginal so the envelope 
theorem result of page 10 does not apply), and their central estimates of money-based MECRs 
are substantially higher, at 9.51 and 3.25 respectively.  31
•  As might be expected, weighting elasticities towards the intensive margin 
tends to make the demogrant look favourable relative to the in-work 
benefit, and vice versa. Responses wholly restricted to the intensive 
margin (as in the Mirrlees model) is the only case examined for which 
w Ψ  exceeds  d Ψ . 
•  In some cases with high extensive elasticities, the MECRs are undefined 
for some years because tax rates were so high that marginal rate rises 
were revenue-reducing and/or payments to workers were revenue-raising 
so that revenue-neutral marginal reforms were impossible. These 
possibilities were mentioned in Section 2.3 and are discussed further in 
Section 7.  
•  Results are fairly sensitive to the elasticities assumed for the top decile 
alone, suggesting that careful thought must be given as to the appropriate 
treatment of these high earners (cf footnote 19). 
•  Increasing the degree of variation in elasticities between groups results in 
higher estimates of both MECRs for the cases examined, although it is 
not clear how far this can be generalised. 
•  Overall, it is clear that estimates of MECRs are highly sensitive to 
assumed elasticities, a finding shared with virtually all the previous 
literature; but my findings also support Eissa et al’s (2004) conclusion 
that “the composition of the total labour supply elasticity is as important 
as its size” [their italics]. 
 
6.3. The level and aggregation of tax rates 
The discussion of Section 2.4 made clear the potential importance of 
disaggregating tax rates in the presence of heterogeneity. In Figure 6 and Figure 
7, the gap between the thick grey and black lines shows, for baseline elasticities, 
the effect on the MECR of using within-year average marginal and participation 
tax rates for each of the 100 demographic type-income groups along the lines of   32
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IKKS, rather than allowing them to take different values for each individual in 
the sample.
21  
                                                 
21 Earnings are also averaged within groups for completeness, though this makes a negligible 
difference to the results.  33
As predicted,  d Ψ  is lower when tax rates are aggregated, and it turns out that 
this difference is substantial: the average value of  d Ψ  over the period is 4.52 
using disaggregated tax rates, but only 3.31 if the tax rates are aggregated. Figure 
6 also shows the effect of aggregating tax rates in combination with adopting 
IKKS’s baseline specification of elasticities, and appears to show that these two 
differences can account for the bulk of the disparity between our estimates for 
1998.
22 
The effect of disaggregation on  w Ψ  is theoretically ambiguous. Figure 7 shows 
that, with my baseline elasticities, aggregating tax rates increases the estimated 
MECR for an in-work benefit. The similarity between my estimate and IKKS’s 
estimate of  w Ψ  in 1998 arises because this difference is offset by our different 
elasticity specifications. There is an added complication, however. As shown in 
Figure 3, my estimates of participation tax rates for 1998 substantially exceed 
IKKS’s on average. The gap between the thick grey and black lines in Figure 8 
and Figure 9 shows the effect of recalculating the MECRs with each individual’s 
participation tax rate scaled down so that the average matches IKKS’s estimate 
(the tax rates remain fully disaggregated and my baseline elasticities are used). 
As might be expected, this makes a large difference to the results. Interestingly, 
though, going on to use averages of these scaled-down tax rates within the usual 
100 groups (the thin grey lines) makes very little difference. While not wholly 
surprising – since Ψ  increases more than proportionately with tax rates, greater 
dispersion of tax rates should have a bigger effect if tax rates are high to start 
with – this illustrates the point that it is more important to disaggregate tax rates 
when they are high than when they are low. 
                                                 
22 Remaining differences are primarily caused by different estimated levels of taxes (see below), 
although slight differences in samples might also matter.  34
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6.4. Redistribution within demographic groups 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the MECRs associated with redistributing income 
within four broad family types. As discussed in Section 2.4, this allows us to see 
whether the relative merits of a demogrant and an in-work benefit are different   35
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for the different groups while taking as given the government’s preferences for 
redistribution between family types. 
The levels of, and trends in, the MECRs for couples with children are broadly 
similar to those for redistribution over the population as a whole. For singles, the  36
in-work benefit policy looks more favourable relative to the demogrant, and vice 
versa for childless couples.
23 The difference between these groups in the MECR 
for a demogrant has shrunk over time, but trends in the MECR for an in-work 
benefit have been similar for all of them.  
The MECRs are undefined for lone parents over the majority of the period 
because (given the baseline elasticities) tax rates for lone parents have been 
above the Laffer bound. Before 1988 (and in 1990 and 2000), it was also the case 
that an (infinitesimal) lump-sum payment to working lone parents would have 
been revenue-raising. These are the possibilities mentioned in Section 2.3 in 
which additional taxes are revenue-reducing or lump-sum payments to workers 
are revenue-raising so a revenue-neutral marginal reform of this kind is 




                                                 
23 Analysis of policies restricted to smaller groups (not shown) reveals a high degree of 
heterogeneity within couples: MECRs for women with non-working partners look like those for 
lone parents, those for childless men with non-working partners look like those for singles, and so 
on.  37
7. Interpretation, policy implications and directions for 
future research 
The approach taken in this paper of estimating MECRs for particular policies 
rather than an optimal tax schedule reflects a desire to generate results without 
having to impose assumed social preferences. It is important to recognise that the 
corollary of this is that estimates of MECRs cannot in general answer the 
question of which of the policies under consideration is the ‘better’ policy in the 
sense of maximising a social welfare function, since they just aggregate all gains 
of gainers and all losses of losers. Aside from the difficulties of making 
interpersonal utility comparisons, the identity of the gainers and losers varies: 
specifically, gains from the in-work benefit extend further up the income 
distribution than those from a demogrant but are denied to non-workers; also, a 
given policy will have different gainers in different years as the income 
distribution changes. The relative merits of the two policies depend on the social 
welfare weights attached to the two groups as well as on the MECRs. 
But there is some difficulty even with IKKS’s claim that the MECR “can be 
interpreted as a critical value for the relative social welfare weight between the 
two groups” (the same basic idea as Okun’s concept of acceptable leakage – see 
footnote 6): in general the MECR is uninformative as to the distribution of gains 
and losses within the two groups. Constructing (implicitly or explicitly) a single 
social welfare weight for each group is therefore complicated by the need to 
weight individuals in the group by the size of their gain or loss, which defeats the 
object of having a summary statistic. This problem might be thought less severe 
for the particular reforms considered here since both reforms involve net 
transfers that are linear in income (the only difference being whether non-
workers are excluded), but this makes little difference since neither social 
welfare weights nor the underlying income distribution need follow this pattern. 
One special case in which MECRs do yield policy recommendations is that of a 
utilitarian social welfare function. In that case, all individual gains and losses can 
simply be added together. This yields the general rule that the policy with the 
lower MECR is superior, and the action rule that a policy should be pursued if 
and only if there is a deadweight gain so that D is negative and Ψ  is less than  38
one (ie rarely for the in-work benefit, never for the demogrant). But this simple 
outcome, with its strong aversion to redistribution, arises because the assumption 
of no income effects is crucial with a utilitarian social welfare function: for a 
utilitarian, the primary rationale for redistribution is declining marginal utility of 
income, which is assumed away in this model. 
There is one result that yields more general policy recommendations. Section 6 
and Appendix A present a number of scenarios in which the MECRs are 
undefined because Dd is greater than one (implying that a marginal reduction in 
tax rates would raise money) or because the denominator of equation (16) is 
negative (implying that an infinitesimal lump-sum payment to workers would 
raise money). Scenarios giving rise to this generally involve assuming high 
extensive elasticities of labour supply or redistributing only within the group of 
lone parents.  
In a model where other families’ incomes have no effect on individuals’ utilities, 
tax cuts or benefit increases that increase government revenue are Pareto-
improving. That leads to the striking conclusion that for these cases (subject to 
assumed elasticities and all the other assumptions of the model), the tax and 
benefit system in question is sub-optimal for any Paretian social welfare weights 
the government might have.  
Almost any tax and benefit system can, of course, be justified by a non-Paretian 
social welfare function. For example, a ‘super-Rawlsian’ social welfare function, 
in which the reduction of inequality is so paramount a goal that the government 
would be willing to make everyone (including the poorest) worse off in order to 
achieve it, could justify taxation above the revenue-maximising level or a lack of 
in-work benefits. 
24 
Indeed, the government might have objectives that do not correspond to a 
‘welfarist’ social welfare function (ie one in which social welfare is a function 
only of individual/family utilities) of the type traditionally used in optimal 
taxation analysis: even if reducing lone parents’ tax rates, say, was Pareto-
improving, the government might decide that it is simply ‘unfair’ to give one 
family type preferential treatment in this way (this could be viewed as a 
                                                 
24 Another non-Paretian objective function with similarly interesting characteristics is the equal 
sacrifice principle: see Young (1990) for a discussion.  39
horizontal equity argument). Such social preferences cannot easily be 
incorporated in a welfarist social welfare function, and the traditional approach 
of the optimal taxation literature to this kind of objective is to place direct 
restrictions on the set of available policy instruments instead.
25  
It is precisely in avoiding having to place any restrictions on the objective 
function of the government that the present approach of quantifying the MECR 
has advantages over the optimal taxation approach. However, a reader willing to 
accept the assumptions of the model and willing to assume a Paretian social 
welfare function might have a bone to pick with governments of the last 25 
years. 
The caveat that these results are subject to the assumptions made in this paper is 
an important one, however. Most obviously for these cases of apparently Pareto-
inefficient levels of taxation, labour supply elasticities might be much lower than 
is assumed for these cases. But other assumptions are also relevant: for example, 
the model assumes that family structure is exogenous (reducing tax rates for lone 
parents creates incentives for parents to separate and for singles to have children, 
which might be thought undesirable in itself and have fiscal consequences) and 
neglects issues of administrative cost and transparency (reducing tax rates for 
lone parents could complicate the tax system, increasing its administrative 
burden and making it harder for the public to understand).  
In fact, there is a whole raft of dubious assumptions underlying the conclusions 
in this paper and others in the field. Some assumptions are necessary to reach any 
kind of conclusion – something that is notoriously difficult in the field of optimal 
taxation – and others have been imposed perhaps unnecessarily in this paper for 
the sake of simplicity and transparency. But successive researchers have 
succeeded in building ever more plausible models, and if research in this field is 
ever to be (or deserve to be) taken seriously by policy-makers, future research 
should continue in this vein. Possible avenues for future investigation in terms of 
relaxing assumptions made in this paper include: 
                                                 
25 Besley and Coate (1992, 1994) and Kanbur et al (1994) look at another non-welfarist objective, 
that of alleviating poverty in monetary terms (regardless of utility), and reach interesting 
conclusions.  40
-  Further disaggregating elasticities. This analysis has allowed for separate 
elasticities for each of 100 groups. As noted in Section 2.4, this is 
insufficient if elasticities are correlated with income shares and tax rates 
within groups, a proposition that seems eminently plausible: if we accept 
that elasticities vary across income deciles, it seems likely that they also 
vary within deciles. Estimating a labour supply model on the same data 
would allow for fully disaggregated elasticities. 
-  Income effects. Recent papers using similar models such as Eissa et al 
(2004), Saez (2002) and Liebman (2004) do this. 
-  Treatment of couples. Dubious treatment of family decision-making is a 
feature this model shares with almost all of the optimal taxation and 
related literature. 
-  Incorporate concern for relative incomes etc in the utility function. 
Benchmarking of consumption expectations etc is a long-running but still 
active field in economics (see Galbraith, 1958, for a wide-ranging 
polemic and Layard, 2005, for an interesting recent discussion), and some 
progress has been made in integrating this into optimal taxation theory 
(see Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978, and, for a macroeconomic perspective, 
Abel, 2003). But more could be done, including looking at how this 
affects estimates of the MECR. 
-  Incorporate public services in tax rates. As noted in Appendix B, public 
services provided differentially by income can affect work incentives.  
-  Older workers. This paper deliberately excluded over-55s because their 
labour supply behaviour involves idiosyncratic issues. Incorporating this 
group without assuming away such issues would be a useful 
development. 
-  Time periods. This paper has been unspecific about the time period over 
which income and labour supply are considered (the empirical work has 
of necessity been done using whatever pay period individuals report in 
the FES and EFS). But as Saez (2002) points out, the intensive margin 
becomes relatively more important the longer the time frame considered 
(as the extreme case, almost everyone works at least one hour in their  41
lifetime). More fundamentally, redistribution of income in a particular 
year will look much less progressive over the distribution of lifetime 
income than over the distribution of income in that year (a similar point is 
made by Browning, 1995, endnote 14). If policy-makers care about 
redistributing towards those with low permanent incomes, therefore, 
estimates of the MECR understate the true efficiency cost of 
redistribution for these policies.  
-  Incorporate behavioural responses other than labour supply. A formal 
treatment allowing for taxable income to respond to tax reform via effort, 
avoidance and evasion responses as well as labour supply would be 
useful in light of the evidence on the importance of these responses 
(Feldstein 1995, 1999). More ambitiously, making family composition 
and human capital formation endogenous to the model would be an 
extremely interesting (albeit difficult) path to pursue. 
-  Dynamics. The previous three points all touch on the more general 
challenge of moving away from the static framework which has 
dominated this literature. Saving decisions, effects of non-work on human 
capital and labour market attachment, family planning, decisions to 
study/train and to retire, and expectations as to the permanency of 
reforms, are only a few of the myriad features of the ‘real world’ which 
are absent in this static model. 
Relaxing such assumptions represents one huge and promising theme for future 
research. The other obvious theme would be to examine different reforms.  
Moving beyond a framework of marginal reforms introduces the complication 
that the welfare effects of behavioural responses must be taken into account, so 
the welfare trade-off diverges from the money trade-off. A number of studies 
find this divergence to be quite large (see footnote 20 and Browning, 1995, 
amongst others), so the results here may not be generalizable to larger reforms. 
That the size of reforms affects the MECR is one of the attractions of a marginal 
analysis: infinitesimal perturbations provide a much cleaner analysis of the 
present situation. But for ‘real world’ reform proposals, a non-marginal analysis 
(along the lines of Liebman, 2001) might be a more promising approach than a  42
marginal analysis ignoring the direct welfare effect of behavioural responses 
(such as Eissa et al, 2004). 
More interestingly, future research might focus on reforms that affect different 
demographic groups differently. This paper has looked at the MECR within 
groups, to see whether the relative merits of expanding a demogrant versus an in-
work benefit differ between groups, but deliberately steered clear of the question 
of redistribution between groups. Future research might focus on ‘tagging’, the 
idea of using observable correlates of income (or needs) to achieve redistribution 
more efficiently than basing it on income alone. Despite widespread awareness 
of, and acclaim for, Akerlof’s (1978) seminal paper on the subject, little account 
has been taken of tagging in the optimal taxation literature (Kremer, 1997, Rowe 
and Wolley, 1998, Immonen et al, 1998, and Boadway and Pestiau, 2004, are 
honourable exceptions). I am aware of nothing at all attempting to integrate 
tagging with estimates of the MECR. Comparing the MECR for a tax-financed 
increase in child benefit, say, with the demogrant and the in-work benefit, would 
be an interesting exercise. More ambitious still would be to integrate this with 
behavioural developments in the model by, for example, introducing elasticities 
associated with fertility. 
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8.  Conclusions  
The central finding of this paper is that the marginal efficiency cost of 
redistribution in the UK is much lower for an in-work benefit policy than for a 
demogrant. The efficiency loss associated with a marginal in-work benefit has 
consistently been low (and occasionally negative): even at its current 25-year 
high, the policy would cost losers only £1.30 per pound that the gainers gained. 
By contrast, losers from a demogrant would currently lose £4.30 per pound that 
gainers received, higher than at other times over the last 15 years but still well 
short of the peak of £8.02 seen in 1981. The in-work benefit policy looks even 
more favourable if paid to (and financed by) only singles; it looks less favourable 
if implemented only for childless couples. Increasing in in-work benefits and/or 
cutting tax rates for lone parents have provided opportunities for Pareto-
improving reforms to the tax and benefit system for most of the period since 
1979. 
The finding that these estimates of the MECR are highly sensitive to the overall 
levels of tax rates and elasticities is hardly original. Perhaps less widely 
recognised is the importance of the composition of the overall labour supply 
elasticity, in terms of the relative importance of the intensive and extensive 
margins and the variation in both across the population. An entirely new finding 
of this paper is that, at least with the tax rates I estimate, disaggregating tax rates 
to the individual level makes a substantial difference to the results, something 
which needs to be incorporated in future work. Allowing for heterogeneity in 
consumption tax rates, which make up a large part of the overall tax wedge, is a 
further methodological development which should improve the accuracy of 
future estimates of the MECR. In a field where it has been common practice to 
conduct “simulations” based on a single elasticity and a single tax rate, or at best 
a relatively small number, this focus on the importance of heterogeneity is long 
overdue. 
Notwithstanding the sensitivity of my results to assumed labour supply 
elasticities, the finding that the MECR for a demogrant is substantially higher 
than that for an in-work benefit is quite robust. This should be of interest to 
policy-makers. However, to provide a genuinely credible basis for policy- 44
making, future research must concentrate on attacking the numerous assumptions 
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Appendix A. Full sensitivity analysis for elasticities 
This Appendix explores how the results of Section 6.1 change if different values 
are chosen for the labour supply elasticities. In each case, values were chosen to 
be towards, but not at, the extremes of findings in the literature (or rather, in that 
literature which allows for an extensive as well as an intensive margin of labour 
supply). The vertical scales on graphs are kept constant across specifications so 
that the different cases can easily be compared. 
 
The average intensive elasticity 
The baseline case (Table 5) has intensive elasticities averaging 0.1 across the 
population. Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the MECRs for the two policies if the 
average intensive elasticity is higher (0.2) or lower (0.05) than that. Each 
individual’s intensive elasticity is scaled by the same factor relative to the 
baseline case (ie doubled in the high case, halved in the low case); extensive 
elasticities are unchanged from the baseline case. The elasticities are shown in 
full in Table 7 and Table 8. 
The Figures show that a higher intensive elasticity makes both policies look less 
efficient, as one would expect. It has a bigger proportionate effect on w Ψ : for the 
demogrant, a higher intensive elasticity just adds to an already high level of 
inefficiency caused primarily by distortions on the extensive margin; but for the 
in-work benefit, the extensive margin has ambiguous properties and it is 
distortions to working hours in raising the revenue that unambiguously drive up 
the efficiency cost of redistribution, putting  w Ψ  on the same kind of scale as 
d Ψ . 
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The average extensive elasticity 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 respectively show the MECRs for high and low average 
extensive elasticities, keeping the intensive elasticities as in the baseline case.  
                                                 
26 η and ε in the legends of this and subsequent Figures denote average extensive and intensive 
elasticities – variation around these averages is described in the text and relevant Tables.  53












1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
















1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004




The high case is 0.4 and the low case 0.1, compared with a baseline of 0.25; 
Table 9 and Table 10 show them in full. 
A higher extensive elasticity worsens the MECR associated with a demogrant. 
This sensitivity is rather greater than for the intensive elasticity shown in Figure  54
12, essentially because participation tax rates are higher than marginal tax rates. 
For an average elasticity of 0.4 the MECR is off the scale from 1981 to 1984, 
peaking in 1981 at a value of 94 (meaning that gainers from the reform receive 
barely 1 per cent of the cost to the losers). 
The effect of the extensive elasticity on  w Ψ  is theoretically ambiguous. Figure 
15 shows that in this case, a higher extensive elasticity is associated with a lower 
MECR: the positive participation response to the benefit outweighs the negative 
participation response to the tax. Indeed, if the scenario with an average elasticity 
of 0.4 was correct, then 1981 and 1982 are cases in which a lump-sum payment 
to workers in fact raises revenue and the MECR is undefined. The policy 
implications of this are discussed in Section 7. 
 
The overall average elasticities 
Having examined the robustness of the results to the elasticity on each margin, 
we can now look at the kind of debate prevalent in the literature. First, the simple 
question of the overall elasticity of labour supply. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show 
cases where both the average intensive elasticity and the average extensive 
elasticity are higher (0.2 and 0.4 respectively) or lower (0.05 and 0.1) than the 
baseline case (0.1 and 0.25); these are the scenarios in Table 11 and Table 12 
respectively. 
The results for the demogrant should by now be no surprise:  d Ψ  is highly 
sensitive to overall elasticities. In the high elasticity scenario,  d Ψ  is off the scale 
before 1987; what cannot be seen from Figure 16, therefore, is that for this 
specification 1981-1984 are years in which tax rates exceeded the Laffer bound 
and so the MECR is undefined. The policy implications of this are discussed in 
Section 7. 
Figure 17 is extremely interesting. We saw in Figure 13 and Figure 15 that a 
higher average intensive elasticity increased the MECR for the in-work benefit 
policy, while a higher average extensive elasticity reduced the MECR. The 
pattern when both average elasticities are reduced is thus to be expected: the 
effect on  w Ψ  is small and of variable sign, with the main effect being to reduce  55
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fluctuations. But when both average elasticities are increased, the MECR rises 
dramatically – in some years, more than when just the intensive elasticity is 
increased. That implies that the effect of a higher extensive elasticity – 
theoretically ambiguous, but seen to reduce  w Ψ  in Figure 15 – can have a 
different sign depending on the intensive elasticity. With an intensive elasticity  56
of 0.1 or 0.05, a higher extensive elasticity reduces the MECR associated with an 
in-work benefit, but with an intensive elasticity of 0.2, a higher extensive 
elasticity sometimes reduces and sometimes increases the MECR. 
w Ψ , like  d Ψ , is undefined from 1981-1984 in the high elasticity scenario since 
there is no revenue available for distribution. As with Figure 15, however, 1981 
and 1982 are years in which an in-work benefit would have been revenue-raising. 
Thus we have the perverse case discussed in Section 2.3 in which it would be 
theoretically possible to introduce a revenue-raising in-work benefit to pay for a 
revenue-reducing rise in tax rates. 
 
Responses concentrated on different margins 
A second active debate in the literature is over the relative importance of the 
intensive and extensive margins of labour supply response. Figure 18 and Figure 
19 show cases with elasticities more weighted towards the extensive margin 
(extensive averaging 0.4, intensive 0.05) and towards the intensive margin (0.1 
and 0.2) than the baseline case; the full specifications are in Table 13 and Table 
14. 
The MECR for an in-work benefit is lower if responses are more focussed on the 
extensive margin, of course – that is the reason for focussing on the two margins 
in the first place. The effect for a demogrant is theoretically ambiguous, but 
Figure 18 shows that in practice a more prominent extensive margin increases the 
MECR here too, essentially because participation tax rates are higher than 
marginal tax rates. 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 also show the extreme case in which there is no 
extensive margin at all – the original Mirrlees-type model as analysed by 
Browning and Johnson (1984) and Ballard (1988). For this scenario (shown in 
Table 15), I increase the average intensive elasticity to 0.3 and transfer all the 
variation by income and demographic type previously embodied in extensive 
elasticities to the intensive margin. In this case there is no positive participation 
response to the in-work benefit, so the deadweight cost of the two policies are the   57
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same, simply the cost of raising revenue from a marginal rate increase in the 
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but, as the Figures illustrate, the MECR for the in-work benefit is higher because 
restricting the payment to workers achieves less redistribution for the same level 
of deadweight loss. This is the standard finding of a long literature (eg Browning, 
1995) which concludes that negative income taxes are a superior form of 
redistribution to in-work benefits, in line with the Mirrlees (1971) model in 
which negative marginal rates are always sub-optimal; but this is in fact the only 
case I examine in which  w Ψ  is greater than  d Ψ . 
 
The elasticity of the highest-income decile group 
The highest-income decile group are potentially vital because their income share 
is very high, particularly in recent years: the top 10% of UK income tax payers 
now account for 52% of receipts, up from 35% in 1978-79.
27 This means that 
their labour supply responses can be crucial for determining the revenue effect of 
reforms and thus how much redistribution can be achieved. However, the 
responsiveness of this group is complex and disputed (see footnote 19). To cater 
for the uncertainty surrounding this group, I therefore present results using 
different elasticities (shown in Table 16 and Table 17) for the top decile group. 
The high case has an intensive elasticity for the top decile of 0.273, three times 
that for other deciles (rather than twice as in the baseline case), and extensive 
elasticities averaging 0.167, equal to (rather than half of) those for the 7
th and 8
th 
deciles. The low case has an intensive elasticity of 0.091, equal to that for the 
other decile groups, and extensive elasticities set to zero. Elasticities for the other 
nine decile groups remain as in the baseline case throughout. 
Figure 20 shows yet again that higher elasticities increase the MECR for a 
demogrant policy. In contrast with the ambiguous findings for the whole 
population shown in Figure 17, Figure 21 shows that higher elasticities for just 
the top decile group increase the MECR for an in-work benefit. The extent of 
variation in the MECRs is obviously not as great as that from varying elasticities  
                                                 
27 Source: Inland Revenue Statistics. This group does not quite correspond to the top decile group 
in my analysis because my analysis includes some working non-taxpayers and excludes some 
working taxpayers (the self-employed etc) and all non-working taxpayers.  59
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across the whole population. But the magnitude of these effects is quite large 
considering only a tenth of the working population changes, despite starting from 
a baseline of a low extensive elasticity for the top decile group in a context of 
high participation tax rates. The sizes of the effects are also quite large in 
absolute terms: in 2004, the level of elasticities for the richest tenth determines  60
whether a policy-maker must be willing to accept a loss to losers of £3.34 or 
£5.59 to transfer a marginal pound to the gainers from a demogrant, and whether 
he/she must accept a loss of £0.93 or £1.91 to transfer a marginal pound to the 
gainers from an in-work benefit. Which of these magnitudes is correct could be a 
decisive factor in a policy decision. 
 
Variation across the whole population 
Figure 22 and Figure 23 look more generally at the issue of how far elasticities 
vary with income and demographic type. While keeping the average intensive 
elasticity at 0.1 and the average extensive elasticity at 0.25 as in the baseline 
case, the Figures show the effect of greater or lesser departure from these 
averages across the population. The full specifications are given in Table 18 and 
Table 19.  
The result is that a greater degree of variation is associated with a lower MECR 
in both cases. It is difficult to be confident about what is driving these results, 
since a number of different changes to the elasticities have been made 
simultaneously with a view to obtaining scenarios that look reasonable overall. 
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the revenue effects of in increase 
in elasticities for rich singles etc outweigh the effects of a reduction in elasticities 
for poor second earners, with changes to the top decile group a particularly 
important factor as indicated by the earlier findings.   61
Figure 22. ψd with different extent of variation in elasticities across income 












1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004




Figure 23. ψw with different extents of variation in elasticities across income 
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Appendix B. Methodology for calculating tax rates and 
limitations in the modelling 
 
Tax rates are calculated for each working individual in the sample using the 
TAXBEN microsimulation model. The tax and benefit system in place when 
each family was interviewed is applied to them (taking account of mid-year 
changes to the tax and benefit system where possible) to calculate the family’s 
net income. Each individual’s marginal tax rate is calculated by increasing 
his/her earnings by a penny, then applying the tax and benefit system again and 
measuring the change in the family’s net income. Similarly, each individual’s 
participation tax rate is calculated by setting his/her earnings to zero and 
measuring the change in net family income. Once these calculations have been 
made, it is a trivial task to calculate the marginal and participation tax rates 
defined in equations (3) and (4). Around 2 per cent of the sample (112 
individuals per year, on average) were removed because their modelled tax rates 
were extremely high (above 0.99) or extremely low (below –2 for the marginal 
tax rate, below –10 for the participation tax rate).
28 Most of these cases represent 
either measurement/modelling error or people located at discontinuities in the 
budget constraint, and in any case the formulae are ill-defined for tax rates of 1 
or above. 
TAXBEN models most major personal taxes, tax credits and benefits – the main 
exceptions being stamp duties, inheritance tax and capital gains tax, which in any 
case do not fit easily into a static framework – and the effective incidence of all 
of them is assumed to be on the family.
29 The procedure above removes the need 
to deal directly with the interactions between different programmes. Two, 
however, do require special attention. 
Elementary economic theory shows that (barring outright misperception) the 
long-run effective incidence of payroll taxes should be the same regardless of 
whether they are formally incident on the employee or the employer. Employer 
National Insurance Contributions (NICs), therefore, must be included in the 
                                                 
28 The exact cut-off points made little difference to results. 
29 Corporate taxes also cause distortions, of course, but any ultimate incidence on individuals’ 
labour supply margins is too tenuous and difficult to assign for these to be included in the model.  63
measure of earnings used in this paper (including the penny increment used to 
calculate marginal tax rates) and taken into account when calculating tax rates. 
Consumption taxes (principally VAT and excise duties), too, should distort 
labour supply in a similar way to income taxes, especially in a model without 
saving such as the present one. The calculation of consumption tax rates is 
discussed in Section 4, but once calculated, they must be added to both the 
numerator and the denominator of the tax rate calculation.  
Both policy reforms to be analysed involve a marginal increase in marginal tax 
rates. Because of the presence of employer NICs and consumption taxes, this 
should not be thought of as an increase of the same size in income tax rates. A 
one percentage point increase in income tax rates in fact equates to an increase in 
the marginal tax rate of only (1 )(1 ) employer NICs rate consumptiontax rate ++ , 
even ignoring possible interactions with other parts of the tax and benefit system 
(such as benefits that are means-tested against net income). 
Limitations in the data necessitate three important simplifications in the tax and 
benefit modelling process that affect the calculation of tax rates: 
•  TAXBEN models entitlement to programmes, not receipt, so in effect it 
assumes all entitlements are fully taken up. This will lead us to 
overestimate marginal tax rates for people who do not claim means-tested 
benefits or tax credits to which they are entitled. The effect on 
participation tax rates is more complicated, however, for two reasons: 
first, it depends on counterfactual take-up of out-of-work benefits as well 
as take-up of those to which workers are actually entitled; and second, if 
entitlements are not taken up because doing so is costly in terms of time, 
effort or stigma (this now standard view of take-up comes from Moffitt, 
1983), the net benefit of taking up will be smaller than the monetary 
award: if a person is indifferent towards taking up an in-work benefit 
because the utility cost of claiming is equal to the value of the benefit, 
their net utility is unaffected by whether they receive the benefit and we 
might wish to say that their participation tax rate is unaffected too. 
Incorporating take-up in the model would therefore require rethinking the 
structure of utility as well.  64
•  We do not model the locally varying rent restrictions that apply to 
housing benefit. This means housing benefit is modelled overly 
generously, and tax rates are overestimated. 
•  We ignore the various phase-outs and transitional protections that are 
often introduced when benefits are made less generous. This will 
generally lead to underestimating marginal tax rates, but have an 
ambiguous effect on participation tax rates. 
Three sources of mis-measurement and possible bias which are specific to the 
calculation of consumption tax rates are worth noting: 
-  The FES is known to under-record household expenditure levels (see 
Figure 3.7 of Blow et al, 2004). Equal proportionate under-recording of 
all spending would not matter, since the average rate of tax would be 
unaffected; but in fact we know that spending on highly-taxed excisable 
goods (especially cigarettes and alcohol) is particularly under-reported 
(see Tanner, 1998, or Part 4, p. 5 of ONS, 2001a), and this will lead us to 
underestimate tax rates. 
-  Certain expenditure taxes are not modelled, again leading to an 
underestimate of tax rates. Betting taxes and air passenger duty are not 
modelled at all; vehicle excise duty is partly modelled (it is taken into 
account for calculation of net income, but the number of vehicles in the 
household is assumed not to change with income). 
-  Certain types of expenditure on housing – principally house purchases, 
rent, mortgage payments and water and other charges – are excluded 
since they are broadly independent of income for existing properties and 
it is hard to predict who would move house and to where in response to 
income changes, and so what stamp duty and changes in mortgage 
payments, council tax, housing benefit etc they would face. (Spending 
that is variable within the existing property – on insurance, repairs, DIY 
materials etc – is included.) This means we assume either that additional 
income is not spent on increasing housing quality, or more broadly that 
the household pays extra taxes at the same rate as on other goods. 
  65
It is also worth pointing out that public services which are provided differentially 
by income (such as benefits in kind, health services and council housing) might 
affect incentives to work, so by ignoring them we might be thought of as 
underestimating effective tax rates (assuming the public services are provided 
progressively). This is an omission throughout the literature, and remedying it 
would be a major research project in its own right. 
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